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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY:

REFUSAL TO IMPUTE PUNITIVE DAMAGES

TO A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

FOR THE INTENTIONAL TORT OF AN

EMPLOYEE-Williams v. City of New York, 508 F.2d 356 (2d Cir.
1974).
In Williams v. City of New York' the Second Circuit Court of
,Appeals denied an award of exemplary damages in a suit for malicious prosecution citing as authority numerous New York state
cases. New York's common law has refused to award punitive damages against a municipal corporation.2
. Samuel Tito Williams was arrested in 1947 and accused in the
murder of a young black girl. Williams' guilt was established at trial
almost solely by the admission of a confession obtained in a lengthy
police custodial interrogation. 3 The jury necessarily found in con4
victing him of murder that his confession was voluntarily given.
Prior to a federal habeas corpus decision in his favor, Williams
filed a suit for wrongful arrest and for malicious prosecution against
the city of New York. 5 He alleged that the city's agents (the police
department) maliciously prosecuted him in 1947 when he was arrested and charged without probable cause. He further alleged that
the police interrogators coerced his confession with a brutal beating
and a lengthy interrogation. The jury awarded a verdict in favor of
the plaintiff, in the amount of $40,000 in compensatory damages
and $80,000 in punitive damages. It was this award of punitive
damages that was reversed as a matter of law by the Second Circuit.,
In the discussion that follows, this case note will examine the
1. 508 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1974).
2. Cf. Costich v. City of Rochester, 68 App. Div. 623, 73 N.Y.S. 835 (4th Dep't 1902);
Eifert v. Bush, 27 App. Div. 2d 950, 279 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1967); Seifert v. City of Brooklyn,
101 N.Y. 136 (1886); Cohen v. Mayor, 113 N.Y. 532 (1889); Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40
N.Y. 442 (1869); Speir v. City of Brooklyn, 139 N.Y. 6 (1893).
3. Williams sought numerous avenues of appeal at both the state and the federal level.
All of these attempts were to no avail. After the case of Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963), in which the Supreme Court broadened the concept of voluntariness and insisted that
the trial court exercise more control over the admissions of confessions, Williams successfully
appealed to the Second Circuit obtaining a writ of habeas corpus. United States ex rel.
Williams v. Fay, 323 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
4. Under New York law prevailing at the time of Williams' trial, the issue of the
voluntariness of a confession was given to the jury as a separate question. This procedure has
been declared unconstitutional in the case of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
5. At the time of the arrest Williams was 18 and a resident of the city of New York.
The federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity and although it was not at issue in this
appeal it is difficult to ascertain how diversity can be justified given the parties in this case.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the facts and the history of this case see United
States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 323 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964).
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application of New York state common law to this factual situation
and ascertain whether that law was properly applied. This note will
also attempt to examine the public policy ramifications involved in
the court's denial of punitive damages against municipal corporations and offer possible alternative solutions for the courts to follow
when faced with similar issues.
To date American courts have almost universally refused to
award punitive damages against a municipal corporation.7 This,
however, has not been the case when compensatory damages are
involved. 8 Many jurisdictions have eliminated the traditional distinction between governmental and proprietary functions9 and have
allowed compensatory damages regardless of the nature of the tort.'0
It is important to realize that these courts have continued to disallow and overrule awards of exemplary damages, even when the employee's tort is intentional."
The Second Circuit was faced with the question of whether to
7. For those cases so holding see ANNOT., 19 A.L.R.2d 903, 908 (1951).
8. The barrier forbidding awards of compensatory damages was first hurdled in City of
Meridian v. Beeman, 175 Miss. 527, 166 So. 757 (1936).
Although arguably the case is decided correctly it defies a logical explanation. In
Beeman, the court held that the proximate cause of the traffic accident between the plaintiff
and the police cruiser was the failure of the police department to report defective street
conditions to the proper highway agency. See note 9 infra.
9. The traditional duality of a municipal corporation has been distorted by almost every
jurisdiction. The dichotomy is defined, but is not readily understood, by determining whether
the function performed is governmental or proprietary. Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill
531 (1842). If the function is governmental, there can be no tort liability regardless of whether
the act is intentional, negligent, ratified or authorized. The rationale is that the city cannot
function if money raised from taxing is used to pay tort claims. See generally W. PROSSER,
TORTS, § 131, at 977-84 (4th ed. 1971); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in
Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1941).
On the other hand if the function is proprietarythen tort liability attaches. That is, if
the service can be performed as easily by a private concern it is deemed proprietary. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,41 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Shapiro, Municipal Liability for Police Torts, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1963).
Police and police departments are ordinarily included within the protection of governmental functions and were therefore immune from torts.
10. Following the persuasive authority in Beeman, the Supreme Court of Florida in
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) refused to pass the immunity
issue onto the legislature and imposed liability upon a municipal corporation for the negligent
tort of the employee in a governmental function. For the Florida jurisdiction this has eliminated the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions.
11. In addressing a question similar to the Williams issue, the Florida court allowed
compensatory damages against a municipal corporation based upon an intentional tort but
then reversed an award of punitive damages. Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963). This is perhaps the initial case where an award of compensatory damages was allowed against a municipal corporation for the intentionaltort of an employee in a
governmental function.
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allow an award of punitive damages against the city of New York.'
The court began its discussion with an explanation of the requirements needed to award punitive damages against a private corporation, i.e., a discussion of the need for ratification and/or complicity
by an executive or a person of authority.' 3 The court held that this
criterion must be met by the plaintiff to award punitive damages.
And, since these allegations were not substantiated by Williams, the
exemplary award must be reversed. 4 The problem with this discussion is that a simple adherence to the common law rule, that punitive damages cannot be awarded against a corporate municipality,
would have achieved the same end and would have done so with far
less confusion."
Whether the Second Circuit's approach effected a mistaken
application of New York's common law or was, indeed, deliberate,
this decision is significant. It virtually eliminates the distinction
between governmental and proprietary functions and makes municipal corporations liable in the same way and under the same circumstances as would a private corporation." On the strength of the
court's approach it could easily be argued in a future case that with
a showing of ratification or complicity by a managerialpolice officer
(the court implies a sergeant or a lieutenant)1 7 a plaintiff could
collect an award of punitive damages for an intentional tort committed by a municipal employee.
12. 508 F.2d at 360-61.
13. In a majority of jurisdictions, punitive damages may be awarded against a private
corporation for the intentional tort of its agents. These jurisdictions are divided by the
quantum of participation required at the managerial level. In the majority punitive damages
may be awarded without any participation by the principal or any need for any subsequent
ratification. See Clemons v. Life Ins. Co., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E.2d 761 (1968); Joab, Inc. v.
Thrall, 245 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Ray Dodge Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036,
479 S.W.2d 518 (1972); Johnson v. Allen, 448 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
In a growing minority of jurisdictions of which New York is a member, the corporation
through its upper managerial executives must have taken part in the intentional tort, authorized it or subsequently ratified the agent's behavior. See Freeman v. Sproles, 204 Va. 353,
131 S.E.2d 410 (1963); Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, 265 A.2d 404
(1970), Richter v. Plains Nat'l Bank, 479 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Ebaugh v. Rabkin,
22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972); Parris v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 395 F.2d
543 (2d Cir. 1968). New York: Davey v. D. and Z. Foods, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 860, 250
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't 1964); Krasnor v. Horn & Hardart Co., __
Misc. -, 146
N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1955).
14. 508 F.2d at 361.
15. See note 2 supra.
16. Although the Second Circuit inferred in their discussion that it may not be possible
to award punitive damages against the city of New York, a narrow decision based upon New
York common law would have answered the question with far less confusion. The discussion
of the need for managerial complicity or ratification was unnecessary.
17. 508 F.2d at 361.
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This confusion is heightened by examining the court's concern
in the testimony surrounding the plaintiffs attempt to show complicity."8 It appears that the jury could have reasonably found as a
matter of fact that the tortious acts of the police interrogators were
sanctioned or ratified by the proper police official.' 9 The court held,
however, as a matter of law that the plaintiff failed to establish the
required nexus between the interrogators and someone in authority
at the police department.0 The implication appears to be that if
such a causal connection was established the plaintiff would have
approached the burden of proof and punitive damages could have
been granted. It is interesting that, while the Second Circuit's discussion of complicity and/or ratification is not applicable for the
disposition of the case, the court properly concluded that punitive
damages should not be awarded under New York common law.2'
Conceding the possibility that the Second Circuit consciously
extended intentional tort liability, it is important to look to .the
merits and the wisdom of this extension. Is it sound public policy
for a municipal corporation to be liable for the intentional torts of
its employees upon a showing of complicity or ratification by a
person of authority?2 2
In an attempt to answer this question it is important initially
to examine whether there is an analogy between a private corporation and a municipal corporation. If so, are these similarities important in clarifying the issue of punitive liability against a municipality?
Awards of punitive damages against a municipality for the in18. The Court quoted the following testimony from the Record:
"By Mr. Walls:
Q. Were there any superior officers in the precinct house at any time that you were
aware of, by that I mean lieutenant or a sergeant.
The Court [sic]: I didn't, no sir, none until they made me sign the confession.
Then they brought some big men in there. That is all I know."
508 F.2d at 361, n. 3.
19. The plaintiff, Williams, was interrogated for some 18 hours and was brutally beaten
in order to obtain a confession. It seems almost inconceivable that no commanding officer
had any contemporaneous knowledge of the methods used by the interrogators.
20. The court points to the transcript at 171-72 in an attempt to demonstrate that the
failure to establish the causal link was the fault of plaintiff's counsel. In summation, "Counsel
elaborates upon client's lost employment opportunities and pain and suffering, but makes
no mention whatsoever of any part by department superiors in engendering this loss." 508
F.2d at 361 n. 4.
21. See note 2 supra.
22. Private corporate liability in intentional torts is closely divided: the majority allowing punitive damages without managerial knowledge or ratification; the minority requiring
knowledge or ratification. Since New York follows the minority, this discussion will center
on ratification. See note 9 supra.
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tentional torts of its employees appears to be analogous and follow
logically from the private corporation situation. In some respects
there are similarities but by a close examination the analogy breaks
down.
It has been argued by numerous scholars that compensatory
awards in intentional torts generally are sufficient to deter private
corporations and awards should be limited as such unless there is a
subsequent ratification or complicity in the tortious act.2 31 To allow
punitive awards in actuality works only an injustice on the corporate shareholders. This is primarily because exemplary damages are
generally uninsurable and consequently any punitive awards must
be taken directly from corporate assets.2 4 The shareholders are directly affected by diminished dividends and most probably cannot
be shown to be culpable or morally blameworthy. Judicial considerations suggest that these shareholders should not suffer since in the
majority of cases they have not benefited by the tort and their power
25
over corporate management in many instances is very limited.
The discussion is thrown into a new light when the intentional
tort is shown to have been committed with the knowledge, consent
or ratification of a corporate executive. The concern for the shareholder must be overshadowed by the need to deter and prevent such
activity from recurring. The sanctions imposed must be severe and
serve as a reminder to the individual corporation as well as other
corporations that such anti-social behavior cannot be tolerated. 6
The harsh penalty of punitive damages should be a catalyst to
those executives in authority, forcing them to reexamine corporate
policies in the areas of supervision, control and hiring practices.27 As
23. Rice, Exemplary Damages In Private ConsumerActions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307 (1969);
Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages,
41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966); Note, The Assessment of PunitiveDamages Against an Entrepreneurfor the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961); Laski, The Basis
of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916).
24. Arnold v. State ex rel. Burton 220 Ark. 25, 245 S.W.2d 818 (1952); Tedesco v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Morris, Punitive Damages In Personal
Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216 (1960); Comment, Insurer's Liability for Punitive
Damages, 14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949); Note, Insurance Coverage and Punitive Award in
Automobile Accident Suit, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 144 (1957).
25. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 42, 43 185-88 (1946).
26. The imposition of a civil punishment results in a private award rather than a public
fine. It is important to note that the defendants' traditional safeguards in punishment situations may not be adequately protected. He is subject to cross-examination, self-incrimination
and a standard below that of beyond a reasonable doubt. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v.
Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); Alldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages And Double Jeopardy, 20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945); Edgerton, Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 36 YALE L.J. 827 (1927).
27. New York State follows the rule that ratification or complicity is required by the
principal. This appears to be the preferred rule. Note, The Imposition of PunishmentBy Civil
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a direct and necessary result in the re-evaluation the responsible
employee should suffer the loss of employment."
There are some obvious similarities in municipal and private
corporate structure that are analogous to the previous discussion.
For example, both shareholders and taxpayers are directly affected
by punitive awards." In addition shareholders and taxpayers have
a voting right and consequently a determination in the corporate
process. It is true, however, that a shareholder in many instances
participates to a much greater extent because his power is a direct
function of the shares he owns.
It is at this point that the similarities begin to diminish when
one realizes that the vast majority of municipal governments do not
focus on profit making and for the most part a municipality strives
only to balance the budget. Profits are not paramount so that expansion is possible and so that dividends can be paid.
The most important criterion, that of deterrence is present in
a municipal situation but other factors overshadow this consideration.30 The ultimate question, then, remains: Does the Second Circuit's preoccupation with the private corporation model deter the
reasoning process from the most important aspects? The answer to
this inquiry appears to be yes.
It is important to realize that a municipality is a hybrid entity,
partly corporate and partly an agency of the state.3 As an agent of
the state a municipality, through its police officers, has the power
of arrest and the authority to search and seize with a valid warrant
or upon probable cause. These considerations are constitutional and
are therefore crucial. This constitutional dimension necessarily
places municipal corporation liability in a different perspective.
A police officer, being an agent of the city, has the responsibility for enforcing its ordinances and protecting its citizens. When a
police officer violates his obligation to the community he is personally subject to numerous sanctions.
(1) He is presently subject to suit, and awards for both compensatory and punitive damages. can be assessed against him.32 Courts: A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1158 (1966); this rule is also
followed by the federal courts, see Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 909 (1939).
28. In several cases courts have held that continued employment of the tortfeasor is
ratification per se. Ricketts v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 33 W. Va. 433, 10 S.E. 801 (1890).
29. A taxpayer is affected in that awards come directly from tax dollars; a shareholder
by diminished dividends. See note 23 supra.
30. Note, Exemplary Damages In The Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957).
31. 18 E. MCQUILLIAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.23 (3d ed. 1963).
32. Deaderick v. Smith, 33 Tenn. App. 151, 230 S.W.2d 406 (1950); Fernelius v. Pierce,
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(2) He will be subject to the internal disciplinary procedures of the
police department with the possibility of loss in time by suspension
or loss of employment.3
(3) 34 Courts will exclude from evidence the fruits of his illegal activity.
(4) In some instances he will be subject to arrest and possible conviction.' .
The above sanctions are directed exclusively against the police
officer. It seems reasonable that if tort and criminal law are willing
to single out an offending officer for constitutional infringements it
is justifiable to extend both compensatory liability and punitive
liability against the corporate municipality. The rationale is that
where important considerations such as constitutional rights are
involved the city has an additional burden to supervise, control and
exercise extreme care in its hiring procedure.
A city should be punitively liable if it retains police officers who
have shown a propensity toward violence and have previously violated fundamental civil rights. By placing the initiative for enforcement in the hands of the injured party and giving him the possibility
of a substantial award the municipality is forced to create controls
against police violations of individual rights. As a consequence, potentially dangerous personalities will be screened from placement in
areas of critical exposure and persons like Samuel Tito Williams
need no longer fear persecution by overzealous or even brutal police
officials.
Thomas P. Whelley II
22 Cal. 2d 226, 138 P.2d 12 (1943); Noack v. Zellerbach, 11 Cal. App. 2d 186, 53 P.2d 986
(1936).
A denial of due process is a violation of civil rights and civil liability attaches. Geach v.
Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953).
The Second Circuit indicated in Williams, 508 F.2d at 360, that a suit for punitive
damages against the police officers would have been affirmed.
33. The police are under tremendous pressure to get results and since much of the
illegality occurs in the normal scope of police activity it is unlikely that internal discipline
will act as a deterrent. Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (Ct. App. 1954). See
generally, Foote, Tort Remedies For Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV.
493 (1955).
34. See generally, Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A
Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L. REV. 565 (1955); see also MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAW
art. 35, § 5 (1957).
35. In most states, for example, false imprisonment is a crime, but it is rarely enforced
against police officers. But see, Roberts v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 365, 144 S.W.2d 811
(1940); Montgomery v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. Rep. 606, 170 S.W.2d 750 (1943).

Published by eCommons, 1976

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/12

